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The Visualization of Cartographic Information: A Review Essay of Six Civil
War Atlasesby Hardy, Jr. James D. and Hochberg, Leonard J. Issue: Winter
2006Acknowledgement: This essay would not have been possible had the
authors not worked with Professor Edward Whiting Fox, historian, cartographer,
geopolitical thinker. This essay is dedicated to his memory. Works under
review:The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War: Atlas to Accompany the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies George B. Davis, Major,
U. S. Army; Leslie J. Perry; Joseph W. Kirkley; Calvin D. Cowles, Captain, U. S.
Army Richard Sommers, introduction Washington, 1891-1895; New York, 1983,
2003 Government Printing Office; Arno Press; Barnes and Noble ISBN
0-7607-5044-0 Maps of the Civil War: The Roads They Took David Phillips New
York, 1998, 2001 Metro Books, Friedman/Fairfax ISBN 1-56799-586-1 Atlas of
the American Civil War: The West Point Military History Series Thomas E.
Griess, Series Editor Garden City, New York, 2002 Square One Books ISBN
07570-0157-2Atlas of the Civil War: Month by Month, Major Battles and Troop
Movements Mark Swanson Athens, Georgia and London, 2004 University of
Georgia Press ISBN 0-8203-2658-5 Great Maps of the Civil War: Pivotal Battles
and Campaigns Featuring 32 Removable Maps William Miller Rod Gragg,
foreword and additional text Nashville, Tennessee, 2004 Rutledge Hill Press,
Thomas Nelson Publishers ISBN 1-55853-999-9 Atlas of the Civil War Steven E.
Wadsworth and Kenneth J. Winkle James M. McPherson, forward and
introduction Oxford, New York, 2004 Oxford University Press ISBN
0-19-522131-1 Military strategy and tactics are products of the mind, where
every effort is directed toward clarity, but wars are fought on the ground, where
everything moves toward fog. It is a military axiom that no plan survives the first
shot, but it is equally axiomatic that prior contingency planning is essential to
military success. Six military/political atlases, five recently compiled and one a
reprint of the atlas accompanying the nineteenth century Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies (O.R.A.), have appeared to aid the student and
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the specialist connect the plans and theories of strategy and tactics with the
realities on the ground where the war was fought. The Six AtlasesThe six atlases
emphasize both shared and divergent aspects of the war, bringing different points
of view and scholarly goals to the same conflict. All, however, seek to bring an
understanding of the war that can only come from cartographic representation,
and, while each atlas is complete in itself, as a group they illustrate the
multi-faceted political, strategic, and tactical elements of the Civil War. The
earliest, and in many ways still the definitive atlas, is The Official Military Atlas
of the Civil War The Official Military Atlas was designed to accompany the
Official Records (O.R.A.) there was no need for additional commentary; rather
the atlas was to be a compendium of visual representation of the war, needed for
understanding but omitted from the previous volumes. Its maps and drawings
show what was known and what was not known at the time, making it the
premier source both for modern maps of the war and for a grasp of visual
information commanders in the field could consult. The atlas begins with six
drawings by Major Robert Anderson giving a panoramic view of Charleston
harbor as seen from Fort Sumter in April, 1861. These drawings are followed by
military maps of battles, campaigns, and theatres of war, most made during the
conflict, others shortly afterwards. The Official Military Atlas could not reprint
every map or sketch made during the war, but it does include a generous
selection of maps from both sides. From the confederacy, the atlas includes over
100 maps and sketches made by Jedediah Hotchkiss for Jackson and Lee, and it
prints more than a dozen drawn by Major John Weyss for the Amy of the
Potomac. The selection in this atlas illustrates every significant military action of
the war. Beyond maps and sketches, The Official Military Atlas contains
drawings of types of fortifications, of cannons, of uniforms worn by the soldiers
on both sides, of flags, and of road and rail transportation. It also includes
drawings of forts, guns, towns, and battlefields that were part of contemporary
military reports. This atlas presents a comprehensive visual representation of the
war, and, as part of the O.R.A., it is the place where scholars of tactics and
strategy begin their investigations. The Official Military Atlas is one that all
students of the war must consult. Among the modern atlases, the logical place to
begin is with David Phillips' volume, Maps of the Civil War: The Roads They
Took (1998, 2001). Almost all of the maps in this book are from the nineteenth
century, and most are contemporary with the actual events. The atlas includes
maps, from both sides, that did not appear in The Official Military Atlas, but are
well used here to illustrate the course of battle and campaign. Maps of the Civil
War is not, as one might surmise from the title, an examination of the crucial
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arteries of water, rail, and road transportation during the war. It is, rather, an
illustrated military atlas with a substantial complement of commentary which is
most useful when devoted to the maps themselves. The maps properly form the
heart of the atlas, and carry the story of the war with the major strength of
Phillips' atlas being his selection of maps, which, to quote Stonewall Jackson, is
highly commendable. The Maps of the Civil War begins with an introduction on
the political situation leading up to secession and war, including a map, from
April/May, 1861, which showed the probable theatre of war to be eastern
Maryland. This map implied the war would be fought over the border states,
would be short, and that secession would probably stand, regardless of the
statements made by President Lincoln. This view of the Civil War would later
seem to have been somewhat limited, but the map was not inappropriate. The
Chesapeake and Potomac areas would indeed see the first strategic victory of the
war when Union troops secured Baltimore in May, 1861, keeping Maryland in
the Union and preserving the lines of communication linking Washington to the
northeast. The map had presented an accurate geo-strategic prediction for the
first month of war, not an insignificant accomplishment in a nation unused to
such exercises. This atlas divides the war by year rather than by theatre of
conflict, presenting the war chronologically, not strategically as it would later be
studied. The chapters on the five years include commentary on battles and
campaigns, setting them into the context of ongoing war. Phillips has included
several maps by Stonewall Jackson's topographical engineer, Jedediah Hotchkiss,
whose remarkable line sketches and drawings were often done while on
horseback, as well as maps by the Union engineer, Major John Weyss. The
emphasis on contemporary maps gives an additional sense of how the war was
seen and understood by those fighting it. Phillips gives pride of place to the
battles and campaigns in the east, meaning Virginia, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania, which fits the contemporary opinion that this was the primary seat
of war. The chapter on 1861 centers on Bull Run (First Manassas), which was
fought only twenty-five miles or so from Washington. At the time it attracted a
great deal of horrified Union and delighted Confederate attention, far more than
was given to the political/military campaigns and activity in Maryland,
Kentucky, Missouri, and western Virginia. The chapter on 1862 continues to
follow contemporary wartime psychology, and gives great weight to the Valley,
second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and the Seven Days, which was
Lee's first field command. Phillips does not omit Grant's move south, from Forts
Henry and Donelson to Shiloh and Corinth, nor does he ignore the campaigns in
Tennessee and Kentucky. Sustained Union victory in the west, including the
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capture of New Orleans, turned the geo-strategic balance in favor of the Union,
but proved cold comfort to Union politicians who saw Lee and Jackson as
invincible while McClellan, Pope, and Burnside were not. The Mississippi valley
seemed far from Washington, and throughout 1862 the Union conviction
deepened that only victory in the east over Lee could win the war. With that in
mind, voters in the off-year elections in 1862 gave victory to the Democrats.
With its choice selection of elegant and beautifully drawn contemporary maps,
along with commentary and pictures, Phillips's Maps of the Civil War is designed
for the informed general reader rather then the military professional. The West
Point Atlas for the American Civil War (2002) is the polar opposite, designed for
a specific pedagogical purpose, teaching the military history of the Civil War to
cadets. The present edition is based upon an earlier and more extensive military
atlas, also designed for classroom use at West Point, a two-volume West Point
Atlas of American Wars (1959). Over the years, curricular reform has led to the
new version, designed for a course in military history, command, tactics and
strategy set in a broad geopolitical context. The current version of the West Point
Atlas contains modern maps drawn specifically for this volume. They are large,
clear, devoid of clutter, easy to understand, and function efficiently as
illustrations of the events of the war and the military principles they illustrate.
Important natural features û identified by Clausewitz in On War ûû such as
woods, water, and elevation complement the human footprint of roads, railroads,
buildings, farms, and towns. Troop concentrations and movements are designated
by standard military symbols, and are meticulously placed, adding to the clarity
of the volume. Since each campaign or battle is illustrated with its own map or
maps, the reader may follow the war by chronology or by theatre. The West Point
Atlas has no illustrations or commentary, just the 58 maps, a fine example of the
military principle of economy of force. Going beyond detailed maps of battle and
campaign, the West Point Atlas contains several useful general maps of the war,
which direct the reader toward the forest and away from the trees. The initial map
in the atlas, depicting the principal campaigns, graphically illustrates the two
general theatres of the war on land, northern Virginia and west of the
Appalachians, and shows as well how bold and imaginative was Sherman's
campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta to the sea. This map also reminds the
student of military history that Grant coordinated the two theatres for the
campaigns of 1864, bringing, for the first time, the coherence to Union strategy
for war on land that had always existed for the war at sea. The second map is
equally important, depicting the Confederate rail network, showing that the south
did not possess a unified rail system, either in track gauge or in connections
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between major cities. In the deep south the roads used a 5' gauge, while North
Carolina and Virginia had 4'8.5 tracks, and the two systems were only marginally
connected. The Confederacy did not enjoy a complete system of internal
communications; instead the south had two systems which were in many places
only supplements to river transportation. A third strategic map showed the rapid
progress of the Union coastal blockade. When declared in 1861, the Union
blockade was mostly a paper proclamation, but during 1862 the Union navy
closed off or captured most of the southern ports, excepting Mobile, Charleston,
and Wilmington, North Carolina. Together, these maps (2 and 18) illustrate
Confederate transportation and communication problems that even victories by
Lee could not overcome.While the West Point Atlas is aimed at a specific
professional audience, the Atlas of the Civil War: Month by Month (2004) seeks a
more general audience, though it has an equally precise focus. It is a geopolitical
rather than a military atlas, and its sole cartographic display depicts the
political/strategic area controlled by the Confederate government and armies.
The maps are all modern and schematic, and there are only two base maps,
repeated with the new monthly military situation depicted, though neither
contains much topographical detail beyond rivers. One map is an outline of the
United States, and the second an outline of the Confederate and Border States.
The military details are only sketched in, not drawn in detail, so campaigns are
represented by arrows and battles by place names in approximate location. Like
Phillips' Maps of the Civil War, this atlas contains a continuing commentary on
the course of the war, though it has neither illustrations nor contemporary maps.
While covering the same war, the Atlas of the Civil War: Month by Month differs
from, more than is similar to, the other atlases discussed. As this Atlas of the
Civil War clearly shows the only Confederate hope of controlling the border
areas of slavery, indeed, the only realistic Confederate hope of survival, lay in
political persuasion and avoiding military conflict. That did not happen.
President Lincoln's determination to preserve the Union moved the primary arena
of conflict from diplomacy to war, and the Union political, economic and
military advantages began to show at once. The high point of the Confederate
cause in political/strategic terms came in April-May, 1861. The new Confederacy
then held all of pre-war Virginia, most of Missouri, had hopes for Kentucky, and
enjoyed strong support in Baltimore and eastern Maryland. During the summer
of 1861, the Confederate area of political/strategic control began to erode.
Western Virginia slipped largely out of Confederate hands by July, 1861, as did
most of Missouri, while Baltimore had been secured even earlier. Victory at Bull
Run on July 21, 1861, had the effect only of insuring that the war would continue

Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2006

5

Civil War Book Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 25

and become more destructive; it had no impact on the continuing loss of
political/strategic space by the Confederacy. As the war continued into 1862,
Union gains expanded along the periphery of the Confederacy, as control over
the coast, New Orleans, and the northern Mississippi valley passed to the Union.
Lee's stunning victories in northern Virginia made 1862 the northern season of
discontent, but not of strategic defeat. The next year, Union gains west of the
mountains and in the Mississippi valley would continue, and the Confederacy
would be cut in half. The great merit of this Atlas of the Civil War is to show the
continual shrinkage of Confederate political/strategic control, a trend that victory
in particular battles could not halt. The Atlas of the Civil War shifts the
cartographic scale of analysis from the local, such as raids and skirmishes, battles
and sieges, and even beyond campaigns and theatres to a more distant
perspective that examines the geopolitical and geo-strategic dilemmas faced by
Southern commanders and politicians as the territory over which battle could be
offered continually shrank. The atlas divides the conflict into seven general
periods, beginning with the Opening Stalemate from Fort Sumter through the end
of 1861, a period which was clearly not a stalemate but a time of initial and
permanent Union strategic gains in the border areas of slavery. The second
period is entitled First Federal Advances, covering the months from January
through June, 1862. Although McClellan was defeated by Lee in the Seven Days,
and Jackson drove Union forces out of the Shenandoah Valley, Union gains
continued along the Atlantic coast, in the west, and in the Mississippi Valley. The
third period is styled a Southern Revival, in the summer of 1862, though this is
based almost exclusively on events in Virginia. The fourth phase is called
Equilibrium, from October, 1862 to June, 1863, again largely based upon
victories by Lee. The fifth phase is Second Federal Advances, from July to
December, 1863, and included Union victories at Vicksburg, Chattanooga, and
Gettysburg. From January to April, 1864, is a sixth phase, War on the
Peripheries, essentially a prelude to the strategically coordinated campaigns from
May, 1864 through April, 1865, called the Final Federal Advances as the seventh
and last phase of the war. In all phases, however, the Union made geopolitical
gains and the Confederacy became smaller and more vulnerable. These phases of
the war appear primarily in terms of lines on the map of the Confederacy
indicating the limits of southern control. The lines are only approximations, and
are schematic rather than topographically precise. The maps of the months after
July, 1863, show a wide swath of Union control in the Mississippi valley; though
in many places the Union dominated only the river itself. Moreover, the line
dividing approximate Union from approximate Confederate control presents the
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image of a continuous front in the style of the World Wars, while in reality there
were large gaps between the armies and even larger areas where there was little
fighting, though often a great deal of foraging. Not until the campaign in
1864-1865 from the Wilderness to Appomattox could there be said to be a
defined military front line, and that was not permanent until the siege of
Richmond and Petersburg. A sharp geopolitical focus brings to this atlas both
insights and geo-strategic inaccuracies. A third Civil War atlas with a sharp,
limited, and specific focus is William Miller's Great Maps of the Civil War
(2004). It differs in format from the other volumes here considered, as it contains
32 removable maps, folded and tucked in pockets throughout the atlas. This
permits large maps to be conveniently contained in a standard-sized book,
without having to shrink them so severely as to make them unreadable. It differs
again in format by following the course of the war through selected battles and
campaigns, making no claim to complete coverage. Beyond differences in
format, this atlas has a focus the others do not as it emphasizes the map- makers
and the maps themselves rather than the tactics, strategy, or course of the war.
This is an atlas about mapping, limited to the Civil War, and it falls into the area
of cartographic scholarship currently represented by Jeremy Black' Maps and
History: Constructing Images of the Past (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1997). The heroes who emerge in the Great Maps of the Civil War War are the
map-makers rather than the generals, and the basic thesis is that the commanders
were often no better than the maps they had. When the war began, a good set of
maps existed only for the coastal regions, the product of two generations of
topographical engineers who worked for the U.S. Coast Survey. Most of the
engineers working for that small government department in 1861 remained with
the Union, and they were of substantial assistance to the blockading navy and the
Union efforts to capture southern ports and tighten the blockade. Miller also
discusses the work of General Jeremy Gilmer, who organized and commanded
the Confederate Engineer Bureau, which made maps as well as built roads and
bridges. Equally important for the Confederate cause was Jedediah Hotchkiss,
who, though probably remaining a civilian, was the leading topographical
engineer for Stonewall Jackson and, after Chancellorsville, worked for Lee.
Miller also included commercial map making during the war, primarily a
northern enterprise, which illustrated the course of the war and made some
cartographer/businessmen large sums of money. Miller includes John Bachelder's
panorama of the Gettysburg battlefield as the endpapers of this atlas, as it was
certainly the most famous single map of any sort from the war. In general, Miller
emphasizes the Confederate rather than the Union efforts at cartography which
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was both accurate and could be copied in sufficient numbers to reach all the
important commanders. The Union effort was much larger, with the Coast
Survey producing nearly eighty thousand maps and charts in 1864 alone, and
Union maps predominate in The Official Military Atlas. But the emphasis is less
on side than on function, and this is an atlas in which the cartographer is the vital
but unknown hero of the war. A fifth modern atlas, the Oxford Atlas of the Civil
War (2004), is an elegant and ambitious book, integrating modern maps and
charts with contemporary maps, photographs and drawings into a sophisticated
economic, political, industrial, and social analysis of pre-war America, the war
years, and Reconstruction. The primary effort of the Oxford Atlas is to combine
graphic representation with commentary about the American fabric into a
depiction of the course of the war, this providing a context for the fighting and
the outcome. Short chapters, complete with maps, pictures, and charts, illustrate
the sectional divide leading up to secession. These include the incidence of
slavery, the role of immigration, the value of farmland and agriculture, the
expansion of railroads, the growth of industrial production, as well as the
political maps of 1860 and secession. This section comprises the first seventy
pages of the Oxford Atlas of the Civil War, and it presents a clear visual and
written summary of the trends during the first eight decades of national history
that led toward sectional divergence in society, economy, politics, and political
attitudes. The opening section also gives a clear understanding of the relative
strengths and weaknesses of each section. Rather than a theory of irrepressible
conflict, the Oxford Atlas presents a theory of irrepressible and growing sectional
differences which might or might not have resulted in armed conflict. The
introduction closes with a mention of the cultural heritage of the war, showing
maps of battlefield sites across the south, places where monuments and parks
combine landscape with myth and memory. In its coverage of the war, the
Oxford Atlas examines battles and campaigns as well as covering the changing
strategic relationships between the two sides. It covers the war chronologically,
moving from theatre to theatre, from campaign to campaign, as the dates dictate.
The advance on Richmond in 1864 is interrupted by maps and commentary on
Sherman's campaign around Atlanta. The editors have also decided upon full
coverage of the war, including secondary campaigns and battles as well as the
major ones, and have described military efforts that failed and have sunk into the
obscurity of a single road marker. They have, for example, included the battles at
Drewry's Bluff, south of Richmond, in May, 1864, where Benjamin Butler
squandered a genuine, though fleeting, opportunity to take either Richmond or
Petersburg before Lee could arrive to defend them. By offering this level of
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coverage throughout the entire atlas, the editors have not only made this atlas the
most detailed and complete of the modern editions, but they have also enabled
the sophisticated reader to recapture the contingent and surprising aspects of
warfare.The Oxford Atlas describes the war with extensive commentary and
contemporary photographs and drawings as well as with maps. Having opted for
an extensive coverage of the war, the editors needed outstanding commentary to
place the fighting in its strategic and political context. They have succeeded
admirably, with texts accompanying each battle and campaign that are
sufficiently detailed to explain what happened and why it mattered. The maps
themselves are all modern, executed for this volume, and they are clear and
detailed. The atlas opens coverage of the war itself with a superb map of
Charleston harbor, including the location of forts, batteries, swamps, and rivers,
showing that Fort Sumter was a position which could not be held militarily, nor
surrendered politically. In its final section, the Oxford Atlas examines the former
Confederacy during Reconstruction. Beginning with Lincoln's second inaugural
address in March, 1865, the atlas describes the political geography of
Reconstruction, including the Union military occupation. The atlas includes
maps and commentary on southern post-war educational systems, on economic
recovery, and on the return of political and institutional control to southern
conservatives. The maps clearly illustrate that Reconstruction succeeded legally
but generally failed socially, and that the solid south went beyond voting patterns
and included society, economy, and education as well. The Civil War included
not merely fighting; it included victory and defeat as well.Of the new atlases, the
Oxford Atlas of the Civil War has the most general use for the student and the
interested reader. It lacks the beautiful antique maps used in Maps of the Civil
War, which help make that atlas so visually attractive, but the modern maps are
easier to read and understand. It has greater variety in its maps than does The
Atlas of the Civil War, and shows battles and campaigns to greater advantage. It
includes economic, social, cultural and political maps, along with the military,
and adds explanations and comments to them, making it more useful than the
West Point Atlas for a civilian audience. It has a greater political and military
coverage than Great Maps of the Civil War. Though it is the size of a coffee-table
book, the Oxford Atlas goes far beyond decoration. Military Maps:
Functionality, Limitations, and Strategic OpportunitiesAn historical atlas is a
compilation of maps. The selection of maps and what they depict rests on the
editor's interpretation of the events, which at times may be made explicit but
often remains, as the historian Jeremy Black (Mapping the Past: Historical
Atlases,
Orbis,
Spring
2003,
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http://www.fpri.org/orbis/4702/black.mappingpast.html) has explained, implicit.
Agreement among historians regarding the importance of some battles and the
expectation that cartographers should aspire to accuracy in depicting the terrain
and the movement of troops produce shared aspects among the atlases under
consideration, though variation in interpretation has created significant
divergence in the selection of maps, their thematic content, their scale and detail,
the periodization of their presentation, and visualization.A map functions as a
symbolic depiction of action through space and as part of an interpretation of an
overarching narrative. It is a graphic summary of current information and points
the direction of future inquiry. In these six atlases the narrative is primarily a
military one, depicting moments of battle and movement and the direction of
campaign and theatre. With good maps in sufficient number, it is possible to
reconstruct the narrative from troop movements in battle and campaign to the
wider context of society, economy, and politics. The maps become, in se, the
primary instruments of reasoning as explained by Edward Tufte in The Visual
Display of Quantitative Information (Cheshire, CN: Graphics Press, 1983). When
drawn well, maps show the relevant spatial data with the minimum necessary
distortion, and move the reader toward other maps of the same battle or campaign
depicting the military situation later in a temporal and spatial sequence.
Moreover, maps of one battle lead to maps of later battles, extending the
temporal and spatial sequence beyond a single hour or day and from one locale to
the next into the strategic and tactical consequences of time and place for an
entire campaign or theatre of operations. Although each map depicts a military
moment frozen in time, such as a siege or a battle, the running sequence of maps
carries the narrative forward on paper as it unfolded through space and in history.
Maps physically depict a static moment, but encourage a dynamic and
comparative rather than a static analysis of military utilization of space. This
moment may be as brief as in a raid or a skirmish during a battle or as prolonged
as an entire campaign. The extraordinary comparative qualities associated with
placing one map next to another emerge out of the reader's ability to embed
fleeting events, i.e. raids or battles, within the temporal and spatial context of an
entire campaign. Depictions of the battle- field permit the reader to appreciate
how strategic thought promotes surprising deceptions and feints, and how such
surprises sometimes succeed, but always threatened to drain men and materiel
away from where a decisive engagement is anticipated. If well done, historical
atlases of military and political affairs suggest not only the environmental
determinants of success such as the presence or absence of a unified railway
system, but also how military and political leaders utilize the environment in
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surprising and creative ways to overcome their enemies and adversaries. Maps
perform these sophisticated functions with efficiency and clarity because they
illustrate complex ideas rather then simple ones, and complexity is always
difficult to grasp and visualize from description alone. Maps lead irresistibly
toward multiple options in their representation of time, space, and opportunity for
human activity. After viewing a battle map, the commander then or the reader
now is led toward questions about terrain further down the road, about future
troop movements, about the geo-tactics of the rest of the campaign. Maps,
consequently, multiply options, possibilities, and information beyond what can
be contained in mere directions, which are linear only, whereas maps are
panoramic, giving spatial and narrative context for actions not yet taken but at the
time both possible and plausible. One recalls the image of General Grant after the
defeat at the Wilderness to begin the 1864 campaign, sitting on horseback,
covered with dust, pointing to the road that led southeast to Spotsylvania and
toward Richmond. He had the military map of northern Virginia in his head, and
he knew Lee did too, and he knew where the next battle would be, and he wished
to get there first. After repulse at Spotsylvania, Grant again took the road to
Richmond, choosing the route that his predecessors had thought could only be
taken following victory. The student of the war can follow via maps the changing
nature of war in northern Virginia in 1864 from discrete battles to continuous
campaign. Because of the imperatives of scale, a map held in the hand depicts in
inches a space that extends far over the horizon. Maps summarize and organize
the terrain they depict, favoring the general over the local, favoring one element
of nature or the human footprint over another. A topographical map depicts
elevation, a road map shows routes, an historical map includes county court
houses, covered bridges, and old towns. In all cases, maps depict the woods
rather than the trees; they clarify by summary and focus. In command situations,
maps are essential as tools for strategic planning, as in Jackson's flanking
movement that won the battle of Chancellorsville in 1863, or in Jackson's
directions to Jedediah Hotchkiss to make detailed maps of central Pennsylvania
prior to Lee's invasion. For small units, deep in the fog of war, maps show where
one is and how to get out. In after-action reports, often called the warm wash-up,
maps can clarify the fighting, subsuming small unit details into regimental and
brigade maneuvers, presenting a battlefield that seems clearer and more
purposeful than it ever was at the time, as well as showing that every commander
did the right thing, regardless of outcome. For historical study, contemporary
maps perform a further function of summary and focus, by highlighting rather
than occluding error and confusion. Military maps may sometimes suggest that
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generals have access to an Archimedean vantage point, viewing a battle and
campaign from far above the actual terrain, and from a perspective in which the
conflict is perceived objectively and in its entirety. Maps drawn at the time of
battle provide a necessary co
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